The Federalist No.10 (1787)

James Madison

The drafting of the Constitution -- even by so distinguished a gathering as those who participated in the Philadelphia convention -- did not ensure its adoption. In each state there were groups and interests opposing as well as supporting ratification. And as they had done in the years leading up to the Revolution, Americans took to their newspapers to express their views and to argue the merits and faults of the proposed new scheme of government.

Those who supported the Constitution took the name "Federalists," although it would have been more accurate to have called them "Nationalists," since their main argument centered on the need for a strong national government. Their opponents, known as the "Anti-Federalists," were in fact, the more truly federalist of the two, since they argued for a government based on a confederation of states. Because the Federalists won, history did not treat their opponents kindly, and until recently the Anti-Federalists were treated, in the words of one famous essay, as "men of little faith."

More recently, historians have re-examined the Anti-Federalist arguments, and discovered that they raised significant issues, such as the lack of a Bill of Rights and questions of limiting power so as to avoid tyranny. In fact, it was the Anti-Federalist arguments against the Constitution, as much as the advantages that the Federalists saw in the new scheme, that led the latter group to mount their own campaign to influence the people in favor of ratification.

The best known arguments in the debate appeared in a series of eighty-five newspaper essays published in New York and written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay under the pseudonym of "Publius." These essays are considered the most authoritative interpretation of the Constitution ever written, and even today are cited by scholars and jurists in their efforts to understand the meaning of the document.

The most famous of the essays was "The Federalist No.10," written by James Madison, in which he set forth the classic analysis of the republic. Opponents had argued that the United States was too large, and had too many groups, or "factions," to be ruled democratically by a single government. Madison acknowledged that there were in fact many groups in the country, and he lamented that they often seemed to be at each other's throats. Under classic constitutional theory, majoritarian rule should govern, and at the expense of minority rights.

Madison argued that the republican remedy embodied in the Constitution allowed the various factions sufficient room to express their views and to attempt to influence the government. Instead of the majority putting down minorities, the different interests would negotiate their differences, thus arriving at a solution in which the majority would rule but with due care and regard given to minorities. The very number of factions would preclude any one from exercising tyrannical control over the rest. And the medium in which this give and take would occur would be politics, the art of governing.

The Federalist No.10

Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American Constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, usually the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. . . . These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be...
formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of Government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results: and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. . . .

The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed: Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a pure Democracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of Government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure Democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first, the
delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest:
secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter
may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand to refine and the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it
may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will
be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves
convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious
temper, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption or by
other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The
question resulting is, whether small or extensive Republics are most favorable to the
election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter
by two obvious considerations.

In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the Republic may be, the
Representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a
few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to
guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence the number of Representatives in the two
cases, not being in proportion to that of the Constituents, and being proportionally greatest
in the small Republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters, be not less, in the
large than in the small Republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently
a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each Representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in
the large than in the small Republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to
practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the
suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center on men who possess
the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of
which inconveniencies will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors,
you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and
lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and
too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The Federal Constitution
forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred
to the national, the local and particular, to the state legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which
may be brought within the compass of Republican, than of Democratic Government; and it
is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in
the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are
placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other
impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of unjust or
dishonorable purposes, a communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the
number whose concurrence is necessary. . . .

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will
be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States: a religious sect, may
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects
dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national Councils against any danger
from that source: a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of
property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole
body of the Union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady
is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a Republican remedy
for the diseases most incident to Republican Government. And according to the degree of
pleasure and pride, we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the
spirit, and supporting the character of Federalists.

Publius