Taking the Lead: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in U.S. Foreign Policy

Ralph G. Carter
Texas Christian University

James M. Scott
Indiana State University

This article examines the characteristics of individual members of Congress who become “foreign policy entrepreneurs.” Rather than simply responding to an administration’s foreign policy requests, such legislators try to lead Congress by initiating action on the foreign policy issues they care about rather than awaiting administration action. This study examines foreign policy entrepreneurs across a number of factors, including the parties to which they belong, the chambers in which they serve, the various legislative access points they employ, and the different legislative tactics they use. Also examined are the changes in such patterns over time. We test hypotheses about the characteristics and behavior of entrepreneurs using a data set of 2,621 instances of entrepreneurial behavior across the post-World War II period. We conclude that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are increasingly salient players in the foreign policy process and are driven by policy disagreements and partisan calculations.

Controversy has often swirled around questions of whether and to what extent the U.S. Congress influences foreign policy. For years, the conventional wisdom assigned Congress to a secondary position due to the “preeminence of the president.” Particularly since the Vietnam War, however, many observers have paid increasing attention to the role and influence of Congress in foreign policy. While few would suggest that Congress has usurped the role of the executive branch and the White House, there is increasing recognition that the institution and its members matter in foreign policymaking. According to this view, “the resurgence of congressional activism means that it is impossible to understand fully the foreign policy-making in the United States without accounting for Congress” (Ripley and Lindsay 1993, 6). An essential, but largely ignored facet of congressional action comes through the actions of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs, those individuals in Congress who...
initiate action on the issues they care about rather than await administrative action on them. Their characteristics and general behavior warrant attention as they are centrally involved in setting congressional foreign policy agendas, shaping congressional foreign policy preferences, and driving congressional foreign policymaking.

**The Role of Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy**

Inter-branch competition over foreign policy derives from the U.S. Constitution, which establishes the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances by which policy-making power is divided, distributed, and balanced among three branches. Furthermore, the Constitution forces a sharing of foreign policy responsibility by assigning various powers to Congress and to the Executive. An “invitation to struggle” stems from the failure of the Constitution to specify which branch is to lead in foreign policy (Corwin 1957, 171).

For the president, constitutional foreign policy power derives from the general executive power, and the constitutionally assigned roles of commander-in-chief, chief negotiator, and chief diplomat. Use of these powers, court decisions, and the growth of executive institutions under the command of the president—especially after World War II—established important historical precedents for presidential leadership (J.E. Smith 1989). Nevertheless, the Constitution also assigns Congress a series of important foreign policy-related powers. It has the general legislative power and the power to appropriate funds, called “the power of the purse.” In its power to declare war; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to regulate land and naval forces; and to organize, arm, discipline, and call forth the militia, Congress has war powers that balance the president’s commander-in-chief role. Additionally, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress powers over international trade, immigration, piracy, and a few other powers, including the right to “make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.” This mix is, of course, the recipe that establishes the “invitation to struggle.”

Numerous recent attempts have been made to address Congress and its role in U.S. foreign policy. Some have examined congressional behavior and the factors generating it (Blechman 1991; Burgin 1993; Carter 1986 and 1998; Cooper and Young 1997; Franck and Weisband 1979; Hinckley 1994; Lindsay 1994a and 1994b; Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Mann 1990; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; McCormick, Wittkopf, and Danna 1997; Ripley and Lindsay

Among these studies, what might be labeled the “resurgence school” contends that Congress and its members have become more assertive on foreign policy issues since the Vietnam experience, which destroyed much of the Cold War consensus and set the stage for policy disagreements that largely ended the so-called “era of bipartisanship” (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984; Holsti and Rosenau 1984; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; Melanson 1996). White House leadership came under increasing scrutiny as congressional assertiveness increased and domestic pressures proliferated. Of course, the White House and the broader executive branch retained important leadership roles, but the breadth and scope of that leadership was increasingly challenged by Congress. Moreover, many observers believe that congressional assertiveness on foreign policy has increased even further since the end of the Cold War as additional voices from inside and outside government, less consensus over the means and ends of foreign policy, and more varied foreign policy issues have contributed to inter-branch competition in foreign policy making.

A Theory of Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship

The Entrepreneurship Concept

Policy entrepreneurship is a special sub-set of congressional foreign policy activity nested within the larger arena of foreign policy assertiveness and the broadest arena of foreign policy activism. In the broadest circle, foreign policy activism includes any effort by Congress and its members to affect policy, whether in support of an administration or in opposition. Congressional assertiveness, by contrast, involves those instances of activism in which Congress and its members challenge the policy leadership of the administration. Since members of Congress are highly unlikely to challenge policies with which they agree, congressional assertiveness involves those circumstances in which the policy positions taken by the administration are found wanting by some on Capitol Hill. Thus, assertiveness fundamentally concerns the phenomenon of policy innovation or change, but may involve both reactive efforts, such as opposition to proposals or policy from an administration, and
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proactive efforts such as initiation of policy. Congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship is a sub-set of assertiveness that includes only those foreign policy efforts by members of Congress that are both assertive and proactive. Entrepreneurship thereby involves congressional policy innovation or change driven by individual members who are sufficiently dissatisfied with the administration’s existing policy, or lack of policy, to push for their own policy initiatives (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

While Congress is an aggregate body, it is composed of members who care about very different policy interests, and those individual members have considerable power in a largely decentralized body (Hersman 2000; Kelman 1987). In any given situation, “Congress” is really a shorthand term for those individual members who act in its name (Bax 1977). As policy issues change, the constellation of involved members of Congress changes as well, given the different policy interests of these legislators. Thus in the foreign policy realm, an “assertive” Congress is one composed of a winning coalition of members who are dissatisfied with the administration’s existing policy or lack thereof regarding a foreign policy issue.

The policy literature has various names for those who seek to change policy or force policy innovation. The most widely used term is “policy entrepreneurs,” although others use the terms “political entrepreneurs,” “strategic entrepreneurs,” “public entrepreneurs,” or even “policy champions” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1983; DeGregorio 1997; Jeon and Haider-Markel 2001; Kingdon 1995; Polsby 1984; Riker 1980; Roberts 1992; Schneider and Teske 1992; Walker 1981). As “policy entrepreneur” is the more widely used term, we will use it here.

When members of Congress choose to become policy entrepreneurs, they have an impressive number of means by which to press for their policy preferences. Many have noted that individual members of Congress have significant potential power to force changes in government policy. As Loomis (1998) notes of freshman members of Congress,

From the moment new members take the oath of office, they all control million-dollar-per-year operations of staff, communications, travel, and research capacities that allow them to commit substantial resources to reelection efforts, drafting legislation, overseeing the bureaucracy, or seeking higher office . . . The congressional enterprise helps all lawmakers claim credit for governmental programs, take positions on the issues of the day, and relentlessly advertise their accomplishments. But this is
just the minimum enterprise, the stripped-down model that every first-term member gets upon arriving on Capitol Hill . . . (121)

Further, Congress is particularly suited to the efforts of policy entrepreneurs because its members are active, its policy jurisdictions are relatively flexible, and it has multiple outside access points. Conflicts internal to the institution also help entrepreneurs as members, committees, and parties compete for control of issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). External factors facilitate policy entrepreneurship in Congress as well. As Kelman (1987) notes, “. . . a number of changes in the political system outside Congress—involving party organization, voter attitudes, and the role of the media—have encouraged members to ‘go into business for themselves,’ acting as independent entrepreneurs rather than as members of a larger organization” (51). Such individual action on the part of legislators is a longstanding practice, as noted by Sellers (2000): “Since the 1950s, members of Congress have increasingly operated as individual entrepreneurs, independent of political parties” (23).

In short, the policy literature indicates a widespread agreement on what policy entrepreneurs are. They are actors in the policy process who engage in significant action to initiate policy change or innovation (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1983; Jeon and Haider-Markel 2001; Kingdon 1995; Polsby 1984; Price 1971; Roberts 1992; Schumpeter 1939; Walker 1981). For the purposes of this study, we offer the following definition of a congressional foreign policy entrepreneur: they are members of Congress who seek to initiate action on the foreign policy issues they care about rather than to await administration action. Implicit in this definition is the recognition that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs engage in such actions for one of two reasons. The first possibility is that no administration policy for the issue about which they care exists. In such cases, congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs want to innovate new policy and do not wish to wait on the administration to get around to doing so. They seek to set the policy process in motion themselves for this issue. The second possibility is that an administration policy exists on the issue, but the congressional entrepreneur disagrees with it. In these instances, congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs seek to initiate policy change.

Furthermore, we are most interested in those members of Congress who engage in such entrepreneurial behavior on an ongoing basis, rather than those who engage in such behavior on a one-time basis. We believe there are members who seek to be major “players” in the foreign policy process, wanting to be regularly involved in it. Thus we seek to focus on those who engage in
entrepreneurial behavior more than once. Consequently, we offer this corollary: We limit our examination to those members of Congress who engage in more than one instance of foreign policy entrepreneurial activity. Two other questions must also be addressed: what motivates congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs, and what do they do to promote their preferred policies?

Entrepreneurial Motivations

While a variety of motivations may drive congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs, one stands out from the others. For whatever reason, some members of Congress have a passion for, or a commitment to, a particular foreign policy issue. When asked why some members of Congress choose to engage in foreign policy entrepreneurship, former House Speaker Jim Wright (2001), a Democrat from Texas, answered this way: “They have convictions. If they didn’t have convictions, there would be little point in their seeking to serve in Congress.” Often, such convictions are the result of formative experiences. In Wright’s view, military service in World War II prompted a number of veterans later to become congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs. For other generations, the formative experience promoting later foreign policy entrepreneurship might be military service in the Korean or Vietnam Wars.

Such formative experiences need not be solely related to the military. Foreign travel, study abroad, service in the Peace Corps, prior careers in the intelligence community or in businesses involved in international trade, and any number of other examples could be the formative experiences that create the policy convictions that later drive congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship. For example in the case of Congressman Jim Leach (2001), a Republican from Iowa, the formative experience was his former career as a foreign service officer dealing with arms control issues. For Congressman Curt Weldon (2002), a Republican from Pennsylvania, the formative experiences involved majoring in Russian studies in college and traveling early and often in his career to the Soviet Union. As he stressed in an interview, Weldon (2002) was “… convinced that in the twenty-first century, our relations with at that time our arch-enemy were going to be critically important and perhaps I could do something to try to reduce that tension. Plus I was intrigued with Russia after having taken the language, and was encouraged by a professor at the time.” According to one of his aides, Republican Indiana Senator Richard Lugar’s entrepreneurship was influenced, at least in part, by his study abroad as a Rhodes Scholar (Meyer 2001).

For some entrepreneurs, core values provide the personal motivation to push their foreign policy positions. According to his administrative assistant,
Jim Leach has a profound personal interest in the expansion of the rule of law, and when that issue arises Leach becomes passionately involved (Tate 2001). According to one of his staffers, Senator Jesse Helms, a republican from North Carolina, also falls into this category. Helms believes the United States has unique moral values to share with the rest of the world and that these should be pressed by both actions and the power of example (Munson 2001). For other entrepreneurs like Congressman Barney Frank, a Democrat from Massachusetts, the conviction comes from a personal commitment to issues like the nuclear freeze movement and the broader peace movement. Others get involved because they care deeply about human rights issues, whether from the political left like Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat from California, or from the political right like Congressman Frank Wolf, a Republican from Virginia (Frank 2001).

For other entrepreneurs, it might be family background that provides the motivation. According to a congressional staffer who wished to remain anonymous, the commitment of Representatives Robert Menendez, a Democrat from New Jersey, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Republican from Florida, to initiatives intended to weaken the Castro regime in Cuba can be traced to their Cuban-American immigrant heritage (Congressional Staffer 2001). Similarly, Representative and later Senator Jacob Javits, a Republican from New York, might have been influenced to activism in foreign affairs as the son of immigrant parents.

When driven by strong motivations, the most important thing to many congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs is policy success, not who gets political credit for the victory. Wright (2001) stressed this point by saying, “I learned that you mustn’t expect credit if you’re going to be effective. Satisfy yourself [with] having made some worthwhile contribution.” Weldon (2002) and Leach (2001) made the same point. In interviews that we conducted, each noted that they had been involved in pushing significant foreign policy initiatives for which the administration later took public credit. Getting the new policy “right” was more important to them than getting credit for the idea, which shows the power of their policy convictions.

However, there can be other motivations for congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship besides the legislator’s personal policy convictions. For some, the motivation is to be taken seriously “inside the Beltway” in Washington by developing a reputation for policy expertise. Such a reputation, along with the perception that you care more about accomplishing something than about just garnering publicity, can go a long way in helping a member to establish a degree of personal clout within the chamber (Wright 2001). Republican
Richard Lugar is an example of a senator who takes foreign policy very seriously, who studies the issues, and as a result often gets both Republicans and Democrats to vote with him (Meyer 2001). Most in Congress would like to have such influence, either because they would be more effective in their chamber or because the perception of their greater influence could lead to greater electoral success in the future (Lindsay 1994b).

For some members, foreign policy entrepreneurship is constituency-driven. For example, Jim Leach (2001) said religious groups came to him pressing for more to be done to provide debt relief in the developing world, and so he got involved in pushing the Clinton administration to promote that policy position. According to his administrative assistant Bill Tate (2001), other motivations for Leach to get involved in foreign policy entrepreneurship included the agricultural trade interests of Iowans and the immigrant backgrounds of many Iowans. Similarly, Barney Frank (2001) noted that Portuguese-Americans in his district felt some sense of responsibility for East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, which provided his motivation to act on that issue. In the view of one foreign policy aide to a senior senator, most entrepreneurship is constituency-driven, and the most influential constituency groups are often those that reflect very narrow interests and do not stray far from them. According to a foreign policy aide who requested anonymity, in addition to the pro-Israel lobby, good examples of such groups are ethnic lobbies like Armenian-Americans, Greek-Americans, and Cuban-Americans (Foreign Policy Aide 2001). The need to react to strong and well-organized constituency pressures back home is a political reality that affects all legislators (Arnold 1990; Lindsay 1994b).

Another motivation for entrepreneurship is partisanship, which can affect entrepreneurship in two ways. First, foreign policymaking in Congress is becoming an increasingly partisan process over time. While foreign policy may have seemed bipartisan or even nonpartisan during portions of the 1940s and 1950s, by the early 1960s members of the opposition party increasingly began to challenge the president’s foreign policy agenda, so a partisan desire to challenge the administration’s policy can be one motivator (Carter 1998). Second, individual entrepreneurs in Congress expect the support of their party leaders. They look to their party organizations for assistance in passing the policies they favor, and this applies as much to foreign as to domestic policy (Lindsay 1994b).

**Entrepreneurial Activities**

Congress is an institution particularly suited to the pursuit of policy innovation and change. As Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) note, “Congress,
second only to the president, is, rather the major institution for initiating and creating political issues and projecting them into a national civic debate” (478). How, then, is this done? The first step to innovating or changing policy is to define the policy issue in such a way as to promote that innovation or change. Policy issues need to be defined in such a way as to get them on the government agenda, for only then is there the possibility of policy adoption (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995). In the words of Jeon and Haider-Markel (2001),

> How problems are defined or framed determines what factual evidence is relevant, which solutions or alternatives are considered effective and feasible, who participates in the decision process, and ultimately who wins and loses. Problem definitions draw attention to some conditions in society at the expense of others, locate the causes of problems, direct public and elite interest, and subsequently shape and mobilize political participation. Most importantly, new issue definitions on the political agenda may dismantle an existing ‘issue monopoly’ and thereby lead to policy change. (227)

Whether it is called problem definition or issue framing, this phenomenon is fundamentally important in the policy process. How individual entrepreneurs define or frame an issue can largely determine how others respond to it by changing their opinions regarding the matter at hand (Nelson and Oxley 1999). Relatively little effort may be needed to do this, and the effects of issue framing can be profound. Jacoby (2000) notes, “framing effects are extremely powerful—probably more so than previously recognized . . . Differing frames produce widespread changes in the ways that people respond to a single issue . . . ” and summarizes the situation by saying that “the ongoing ‘competition’ between varying presentations of social problems and issues may well be one of the most important dynamics underlying modern political conflict” (763, emphasis in original). As the “new institutionalism” literature stresses, Congress is very adept at framing issues in ways designed to favor congressional foreign policy initiatives rather than administrative ones (Lindsay 1994a).

Using the media is an important way to promote one’s favored issue definition (Jeon and Haider-Markel 2001). While many media sources may be used to do this, the most important media are the national media. As the seniority of members of Congress increases, their access to and use of the
national media to frame issues increases as well (Kedrowski 2001). As entrepreneurs use the power of rhetoric to get others to accept and use their preferred issue definitions, the possibility of getting the issue on the government’s agenda—the second key step towards policy success—increases dramatically (Cook 1989; Riker 1986 and 1997; Sellers 2000). Baumgartner and Jones (1993) describe the process thus:

As disadvantaged policy entrepreneurs are successful in convincing others that their view of an issue is more accurate than the views of their opponents, they may achieve rapid success in altering public policy arrangements, even if these arrangements have been in place for decades. They need not alter the opinions of their adversaries; as new ways of understanding old political problems take hold, different policymakers and governmental institutions suddenly begin to claim jurisdiction over issues that previously had not interested them. The old policymaking institutions find themselves replaced or in competition with new bodies that favor different policy proposals. So agenda-setting has important policy consequences, and these are expected often to be dramatic reversals rather than only marginal revisions to the status quo. (4)

Once issues are framed or problems defined and the policy disputes get on the government agenda, entrepreneurs can then propose solutions, strategize, and “work the system” to organize others and provide leadership (Mintrom 2000). In other words, all the possible actions available to legislators can be used. However, such actions are not taken in a random fashion. Despite its often-chaotic appearance, a type of order is present in the policy process.

In large part, the idea of “working the system” comes down to three major steps. For many entrepreneurs, the first major step is to work with the administration. In order to maximize their chances of success, they seek administration support for their policy initiatives. They may call officials in the White House or Cabinet, seek personal meetings with them, or write them letters proposing the new policy position. Some entrepreneurs will contact the administration regardless of whether or not the president shares their partisan affiliation. For example, when it became clear that Congress was unwilling to take quick action on a Mexican peso bailout plan in 1995, Jim Leach proposed the essentials of a bailout plan to Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers. Summers embraced the policy initiative but asked Leach, a
Republican, to keep quiet about his authorship of the plan for fear of risking support within the Democratic Clinton administration. Leach did so, not revealing his role in the policy-making episode for a period of six months (Leach 2001). However for many in Congress, it is far easier to work behind the scenes with the administration when both the entrepreneur and the president are members of the same political party, a point noted by Senator J. William Fulbright (1966), a Democrat from Arkansas. When entrepreneurs take this first major step, the cost of such support is the fact that the administration often takes credit for the policy initiative. To the extent that this occurs, congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship is a “stealth” phenomenon, flying below the radar of public awareness.

Should contacting, consulting, and negotiating with administrative officials prove unsuccessful, an entrepreneur’s second major step in “working the system” is to broadcast the issue to the public. Kernell (1997) notes that going public “is a class of activities that presidents engage in as they promote themselves and their policies before the American public” (ix). Just like presidents, congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs go public to mobilize the public on behalf of their policy innovation or change. In so doing, they use every conceivable means to get their message out. One particularly powerful way is to hold congressional hearings on their preferred issue. According to a staffer for a congressional foreign policy entrepreneur, hearings provide an opportunity to put more pressure on the administration by getting administration officials to discuss the policy issue on the record or to generate publicity for a policy shift (Entrepreneur’s Staffer 2001). Clearly, this step requires either membership on the appropriate standing committee or access to members of that standing committee. It also indicates the importance of a structural component in congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship: both membership on the foreign policy or national security committees and sufficient seniority to have influence on the operations of such committees.

The last major step for entrepreneurs “working the system” is to take a more traditional, formal route by introducing amendments or legislation to codify their foreign policy preferences into law. This step is often seen as a last resort because of the many obstacles in the highly fragmented Congress that must be overcome for any initiative to become law (Entrepreneur’s Staffer 2001; Loomis 1998). At that point, other legislative activities become relevant—making statements or speeches in committee, on the chamber floor, to the media, or in other public forums; working within caucuses; and building winning coalitions to name only a few.
Entrepreneurial Attributes and Behaviors

This analysis focuses on seven initial hypotheses in two categories to guide its examination of foreign policy entrepreneurs. The first three hypotheses concern various attributes and characteristics of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs as a group. Hypotheses 4 through 7 concern some general aspects of the behavior and activities of this group over time. The combination provides substantial evidence of the growing significance of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs since World War II.

Hypothesis 1: Congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are more likely to be senators than representatives.

Hypothesis 2: Congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are more likely to come from the majority party than the minority party.

Hypothesis 3: Congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are more likely to be members of the opposition party to the president.

Hypothesis 4: Since World War II, more members have chosen to become foreign policy entrepreneurs, particularly those from the opposition party to the president.

Hypothesis 5: Overall, entrepreneurship should be most common on economic-developmental issues.

Hypothesis 6: Since World War II, entrepreneurs should use a greater variety of access points.

Hypothesis 7: Since World War II, entrepreneurs should engage in a greater variety of activities.

Characteristics

We hypothesize that foreign policy entrepreneurs are more likely to be senators than representatives because, as many have argued, the Senate tends to be more concerned with foreign policy than the House, in part because of its constitutionally mandated foreign policy powers, such as the ratification of treaties, confirmation of presidential appointments (Baker 2000; Crabb
and Holt 1989). However, electoral factors also matter. Because senators represent an entire state rather than a district and stand for election every six years rather than every two years, they can be generalists more often the members of the House, and they can pick and choose the issues on which they focus more freely than members of the House. To the extent that foreign policy represents a more national interest than one driven by a local constituency, senators may be freer to pursue such policy interests than are representatives. Furthermore, senators typically have about twice as many committee assignments as do representatives, and they have considerably more access to the chamber floor as well, giving them more opportunities to access the legislative process in order to act as entrepreneurs.

Leading us to our second hypothesis is the observation that Congress is an organization in which structural power is distributed on partisan lines. Thus the majority party controls each chamber’s leadership, committee and subcommittee leadership, and floor agenda (Deering and Smith 1997; S. Smith 1989). Consequently, majority party members interested in foreign policy will have more opportunities and presumably greater success in influencing policy. For the post-World War II period, this suggests that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are most likely to be Democrats, as that party enjoyed majority status in Congress for most of the period.

As has been shown elsewhere, bipartisan support of presidential foreign policy initiatives ended sometime in the 1950s (Carter 1986 and 1994).1 Since then, party leaders have shown “increasingly partisan patterns in their support for presidential positions . . . ” (S. Smith 1994,154-55). The increasing partisanship in foreign policymaking identified by many can be expected to generate more entrepreneurial activity by members of the opposition party to the president (Carter 1998; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; McCormick, Wittkopf, and Danna 1997; Ripley and Lindsay 1993; Rohde 1994; Sinclair 1993; Wittkopf and McCormick 1998). The literature on divided government suggests this as well (Foreman 1988; Thurber 1991; Warburg 1989). Not only is challenging a president of the opposite political party often “good politics” for members of Congress, partisan differences often lead to real policy disagreements with a president of the opposite party. By contrast, we may expect fewer electoral incentives or policy disagreements to prompt members of the president’s party to challenge the president’s foreign policy agenda.

**Behavior and Activity**

Our expectation of growth in foreign policy entrepreneurship after World War II, especially among those who are not of the president’s party—as
represented in Hypothesis 4—is a consequence of a variety of factors. First, as the Cold War consensus unraveled and dissatisfaction with Cold War policies increased, policy disequilibria between members of Congress and the executive branch became more common, providing incentives for members to get involved (Carter 1994 and 1998; Hersman 2000; Melanson 1996). Additionally, foreign policy issues evolved and changed as interdependence and globalization deepened, prompting some members, formerly concerned only with domestic politics, to become increasingly involved in foreign policy due to its intermestic aspects. Members acquired greater resources for foreign policy concerns, including increased staff and congressional institutions, at the same time that Congress decentralized, allowing a greater number of foreign policy access points to develop in committees, subcommittees, and elsewhere. Concurrently, Congress became increasingly partisan (Cooper and Young 1997). According to some observers, such conflict and discord increased markedly around the time of the Vietnam War, and then again at the end of the Cold War (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; McCormick, Wittkopf, and Danna 1997; Wittkopf and McCormick 1998). In such an increasingly partisan atmosphere, one could expect the percentage of entrepreneurs from the opposition party to increase over time. These and other factors establish the basis for the expectation that foreign policy entrepreneurship has increased over time since World War II.

The expectation that entrepreneurship should be most common on economic-developmental issues is based on the presumption that legislators are primarily motivated by the concern for reelection and that the way to get reelected is to bring home tangible benefits for constituents (Arnold 1990; Mayhew 1974). To the extent that Americans vote according to their pocketbooks, legislators should seek to promote the economic development and well being of key constituencies, and this should encourage action on structural foreign policy issues (Lindsay and Ripley 1993).

A number of factors lend themselves to the expectation that entrepreneurs use a greater variety of access points over time. Changes in the international environment, coupled with the general evolution of issues arising there, drive members of Congress into a broader set of foreign policy concerns, such as the rise of intermestic and economic factors, along with changes in the Cold War posture of the United States (Carter 1994 and 1998). In addition, changes in the institution of Congress itself contribute to this expectation. The committee reforms of the 1970s created new subcommittees and eroded the power of the committee chairs over the policy agenda. The increasingly complex, overlapping committee and subcommittee jurisdictions over foreign affairs
issues and sub-issues which generate more foreign policy committee assignments also contributes to this expectation, as does the explosion in the number of policy and regional caucuses, many of which have foreign policy concerns (Sinclair 2000; Hammond 1998). Finally, the more complex oversight issues and opportunities generated by committees and subcommittees, the reporting requirements and detailed appropriations they specify, and the increasing pattern and acceptance of rank and file challenges to committee actions are contributing factors as well (see Blechman 1991).

With more access points for entrepreneurs, those wishing to set the agenda and influence policy face increasing competition from others, and therefore, we expect to see them engage in a greater variety of activities as time passes. Relying on one or two preferred activities may no longer be enough to ensure one’s input. Further, changes in the setting of congressional politics allow entrepreneurs more options. For example, foreign heads of state and foreign ministers now routinely meet directly with members of Congress, far more media outlets exist today than did as recently as ten years ago, and the numbers of registered foreign lobbyists are increasing. There are more ways to do more things to influence foreign policy (Burgin 1997). It is no longer sufficient merely to control the standing committee and subcommittee structure if one’s desire is to control policy. In such an environment, those seeking to influence foreign policy should engage in a greater variety of different activities to shape policy.

**Methods**

For a comprehensive and accessible record of congressional foreign policy activity, this study relies on the oft-used annual volumes of the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (S. Smith 1994). The time period that we study here is 1946-2000. This span of 55 years can be divided into three periods for comparative purposes. The Cold War began almost immediately after World War II ended, but with the Tet Offensive in early 1968, U.S. foreign policy changed. Policy makers sought ways to get out of the Vietnam conflict and to avoid being drawn into similar conflicts for the remainder of the Cold War era (Melanson 1996). Then foreign policy dynamics changed again following climactic events in 1989, which included the collapse of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the demolition of the Berlin Wall (McCormick 1998; Wittkopf, Kegley, and Scott 2003). Based on these events, we divide the post-World War II era into the Cold War Consensus period, 1946-1967; the Cold War Dissensus period, 1968-1989; and the Post-Cold War period,


For each year selected, we reviewed the sections dealing with foreign policy, defense policy, appropriations, international trade and finance, agricultural trade, and others with foreign and defense policy coverage.3 The object was to identify instances of foreign policy entrepreneurship, selecting those cases in which members of Congress introduced their own foreign policy issues, rather than awaiting administration action on those issues.

The key to foreign policy entrepreneurship is the introduction of new issues. Thus incremental congressional changes in administration policy or spending requests did not fit our definition. However, when members raised new issues in spending bills, those were coded as instances of entrepreneurship. For example, changing the spending totals for a weapons system the administration desired or raising or lowering foreign aid amounts to agreed-upon recipients were not instances of entrepreneurship.4 Instances such as injecting funding for a weapon system the administration did not want, earmarking aid to a recipient not included in the administration’s request, or deleting all requested aid for a recipient were seen as raising a new issue and were thus coded as entrepreneurial activity.5 Each instance of entrepreneurial behavior was coded separately. For example, if a senator wrote an op-ed piece and made three floor speeches to focus governmental attention on the plight of refugees, we would code four instances of entrepreneurial activity on that senator’s part. Our data collection produced a set of 2,621 cases of entrepreneurial activity across the 25 years of the sample.

For each instance of entrepreneurial behavior in this sample, we coded the year; the Congressional Quarterly Almanac page number; the individual’s name, party identification, and state; the substantive issue area involved; the activity used by the entrepreneur; the access point used; and the avenue of influence used. Additionally, we coded variables for the president’s party at the time of the action; whether the member was in the majority or the minority
party in Congress; whether the member was in the opposition party relative to the president; whether the member was assigned to one of the traditional foreign policy-related committees, such as foreign relations, defense, or intelligence; and whether the action took place in a presidential election year. To categorize these issues, we relied on the issue area categorization offered by Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969), who used the following four-fold categorization:

The *Military-Security* issue area comprises all issues which focus on questions pertaining to violence, including alliances and weaponry, and those which are perceived by the foreign policy elite as constituting a security threat. The *Political-Diplomatic* issue area covers the spectrum of foreign policy interaction at each of the three levels of the external environment—global, subordinate, and bilateral—except for those dealing with violence, material resources, and cultural and status relations. The *Economic-Developmental* issue area comprises all those issues which involve the acquisition and allocation of resources, such as trade, aid, and foreign investment. The *Cultural-Status* issue area consists of those foreign policy issues involving cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges. It also contains status issues which relate primarily to self image, namely, the decision-makers’ perception of their state’s legitimate place in the global and/or subordinate systems. (79)

In terms of activities, access points, and avenues of influence, we coded 13 different activities and eight different access points. Activities included: introducing legislation, making committee or subcommittee amendments or proposals, attending hearings, issuing reports, proposing floor amendments, making resolutions, making speeches or other public statements, making motions to recommit or kill a piece of legislation, citing for contempt of Congress, engaging in fact-finding missions, enacting procedures, consulting with others, or participating in lawsuits. Access points included the House floor, the Senate floor, a committee, a subcommittee, the White House or other administration location, the public, congressional caucuses, and the courts. Avenues of influence were coded “1” for direct-legislative, “2” for indirect-legislative, “3” for direct-nonlegislative, and “4” for indirect-nonlegislative. Intercoder reliability scores were more than acceptable.
Findings

The data set reveals 2,621 instances of entrepreneurial behavior by 434 different foreign policy entrepreneurs in the 25 years examined. As described below, the data show that the most likely member of Congress to become a foreign policy entrepreneur is a senator from the party opposing the president when that party is in the majority. Such a member is likely to be more and more active across different access points over time.

Characteristics

Results for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Table 1. The data provide strong confirmation of Hypothesis 1. In the sample, about 60 percent of the instances of entrepreneurship occurred in the Senate, while about 40 percent of the instances of entrepreneurship occurred in the House of Representatives. This is consistent with the presumption that the U.S. Senate is more concerned with foreign policy than the House of Representatives. However, as the breakdown by era in this table suggests, this overall tilt toward the Senate increased significantly in the Cold War Dissensus era before receding sharply in the Post-Cold War era. So while entrepreneurship is most likely to occur in the Senate in all three time periods, instances of entrepreneurship in the House are almost as frequent as in the Senate for the Post-Cold War period. If the most recent trend continues, the House may come to rival the Senate in terms of entrepreneurial activity.

Table 1 also shows a robust relationship between control of Congress and entrepreneurship. Overall, nearly 64 percent of the instances of entrepreneurship come from members of the majority party. As important, this linkage of majority party and entrepreneurship grows stronger over time, increasing from a low of 57 percent in the Cold War Consensus period to 71 percent in the Cold War Dissensus period, then climbing to 73 percent in the Post-Cold War era.

Table 1 further indicates that partisanship increasingly matters in the phenomenon of foreign policy entrepreneurship in Congress. Being in the opposite political party from the president increases the likelihood of a member being an entrepreneur; or, conversely, members of the president’s party are less likely to be entrepreneurs. As indicated in the table, 65 percent of entrepreneurship originated from members of the opposition party, while 35 percent originated from members of the president’s party. Even more important, such partisanship has increased over time. During the Cold War
Consensus years, less than half of the entrepreneurship, 48 percent, came from members of the opposition party, a figure that supports the idea of a bipartisan era. By the time of the Cold War Dissensus era, that figure grew to 71 percent. The partisan nature of entrepreneurship increased even more in the Post-Cold War era, climbing to 73 percent of entrepreneurial activity. The data in this table, therefore, seem to provide support for Hypothesis 3 and clearly indicate a hardening of the phenomenon over time.

**Behavior and Activity**

Our overall data show substantial variance in entrepreneurship over time. However, a pattern appears when the results are aggregated by time period, as shown in Figure 1. During the ten Cold War Consensus years in the dataset, there were 185 different congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs, or 18.5 different entrepreneurs per year. During the ten Cold War Dissensus years, there were 232 different entrepreneurs, or an average of 23.2 per year. In the five Post-Cold War years in the dataset, there were 131 different entrepreneurs, or an average of 26.2 per year. Therefore, the data provides some confirmation of Hypothesis 4. On average, more congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are found in each passing era over time.
We discussed the opposition party aspect in Hypothesis 3. As noted, our data support the hypothesis. For the period of this study, 65.4 percent of entrepreneurship originated from members of the opposition party, yet such partisanship has increased over time from a Cold War Consensus level of less than half, 48.3 percent, to a post-Cold War level of 73.1 percent. Thus, consistent with the conclusions of other observers of Congress and foreign policy, partisan differences appear to be increasingly significant in congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship (McCormick, Wittkopf, and Danna 1997; Wittkopf and McCormick 1998).

As Table 2 shows, Hypothesis 5 is supported only for the Cold War Consensus period. For both the Cold War Dissensus and Post-Cold War periods, congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are notably more interested in military-security issues than in other types. As a result, for the overall Post-World War II era, military-security issues are most frequently addressed, comprising 52.5 percent of the activity, followed by economic-developmental issues at 26.4 percent, political-diplomatic issues at 19 percent, and cultural-status issues at two percent. It appears that following both the downturn in the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War, many entrepreneurs wanted to have some input in making military-security policy. Thus it appears congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are much more interested in military-security issues than the conventional wisdom suggests.
Of course, many military-security issues are as much about domestic and parochial concerns related to defense spending and procurement as they are about security policy. Table 2 also presents data differentiating between structural military-security policy that are related to the parochial concerns of defense budget and strategic military-security policy, related to broader security concerns such as military operations, strategic arms control, and the like. The results not only indicate that entrepreneurs are more concerned with strategic security issues in the Post-World War II era, reflected by 76.9 percent of military-security entrepreneurship, but most significantly that entrepreneurs became substantially more focused on strategic over structural issues after 1968, when entrepreneurship on structural security issues dropped by more than a third from the Cold War Consensus era to the Cold War Dissensus and
Post-Cold War eras, 33 percent to 21 percent respectively. Indeed, almost 80 percent of military-security entrepreneurship in the Cold War Dissensus and Post-Cold War eras was related to strategic security issues, such as arms control, military operations, defense strategy, and war powers. Hence, Table 2 indicates that entrepreneurs are more motivated by broad policy interests than by parochial concerns.

Increasingly, one might expect that the committee assignments of entrepreneurs would fall outside the traditional foreign policy committees, such as foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence. However, the data indicate otherwise: entrepreneurs appear more likely to use membership in traditional foreign policy committees as their base of activities. As Table 3 suggests, for the overall period entrepreneurs are 53.8 percent likely to be members of the foreign relations, armed services, or intelligence committees and 46.2 percent likely not to be. When the breakdown by era is examined, it appears that entrepreneurs are 57.7 percent more likely to be members of the traditional foreign policy committees during the Cold War Dissensus period, 54.4 percent are more likely to be so during Post-Cold War periods, and only 43.3 percent likely to be members of the traditional committees during the Cold War Consensus period.

### Table 3. Entrepreneurship and Committee Assignments by Era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cold War Consensus</th>
<th>Cold War Dissensus</th>
<th>Post-Cold War</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of Traditional Foreign Policy Committees</td>
<td>43.3% (320)</td>
<td>57.7% (816)</td>
<td>54.4% (273)</td>
<td>53.8% (1,409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of Other Committees</td>
<td>54.7% (386)</td>
<td>42.3% (597)</td>
<td>45.6% (229)</td>
<td>46.2% (1,212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>2,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers are indicated in parentheses.

However, when access points beyond simple committee assignment are measured, as in Table 4, the data support the hypothesis. Table 4 shows the number of access points, listed previously, that we used in each of the years
of the sample. In the Cold War Consensus period, an average of 4.3 different types of access points were used by entrepreneurs per year. In both the Cold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Access Points Used</th>
<th>Number of Activities Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War Consensus Average</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War Dissensus Average</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War Average</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the Cold War Dissensus and post-Cold War periods, an average of 5.6 different types of access points were used per year. Consequently, the data provide partial support for Hypothesis 5; on average foreign policy entrepreneurs relied on more access points in the Cold War Dissensus period than in the Cold War Consensus period, but the average number of access points used levels out in the Post-Cold War period.

Table 4 also shows the number of different activities, listed previously, in which entrepreneurs made efforts to address foreign policy each year. Again, a trend toward a greater range of activities is generally present. In the Cold War Consensus period, an average of 5.7 different types of activities were used per year. In the Cold War Dissensus period, an average of 8.0 different types of activities were used per year. In the Post-Cold War era an average of 7.2 different types of activities were used per year. Consequently, it appears that Hypothesis 7 is partially confirmed. The different types of entrepreneurial activities increase sharply when moving from the Cold War era to the Post-Vietnam period. However, at that point the number of different types of activities used levels off and slightly declines.

Somewhat less conclusive, yet still generally supportive of this hypothesis is the data in Table 5, which presents the avenues of influence used by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cold War Consensus</th>
<th>Cold War Dissensus</th>
<th>Post-Cold War</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Legislative</td>
<td>74.5% (526)</td>
<td>60.4% (854)</td>
<td>68.7% (345)</td>
<td>65.8% (1,725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Legislative</td>
<td>1.3% (9)</td>
<td>3.0% (43)</td>
<td>4.0% (20)</td>
<td>2.7% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Non-legislative</td>
<td>6.9% (49)</td>
<td>7.0% (99)</td>
<td>5.0% (25)</td>
<td>6.6% (173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Non-legislative</td>
<td>17.3% (122)</td>
<td>29.5% (417)</td>
<td>22.3% (112)</td>
<td>24.8% (651)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>2,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers are indicated in parentheses.
entrepreneurs over time. The data show that entrepreneurs focus the majority of their activity on direct legislative efforts, such as issue-specific legislation, appropriations, and treaties. In general, however, these other avenues—indirect legislative, direct non-legislative, and indirect non-legislative—are typically relied on more by entrepreneurs after the Cold War Consensus period.

As the table indicates, during the Cold War Consensus period, 75 percent of all entrepreneur activity was direct-legislative. In subsequent eras, use of the other avenues generally increased, indicating a diffusion of activity, although use of the direct legislative avenue crept back up in the post-Cold War era, though not to Cold War Consensus levels. Particularly interesting is the steady increase over time in the reliance on indirect legislative tools such as non-binding resolutions, confirmations of appointments, and procedural legislation.

**Conclusions**

Not only is Congress as an institution becoming more assertive in foreign policy, but individual foreign policy entrepreneurship in Congress is also becoming more common (Scott and Carter 2002). The data presented here on the characteristics and behavior of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs offer a useful overview of the increasingly important element of congressional foreign policy activism. As Figure 1 shows, over time more members of Congress are choosing to become foreign policy entrepreneurs. Overall, individual entrepreneurs are becoming more active from more access points and generally in a greater variety of ways on foreign policy issues. The data underlying this overarching result suggest several concluding observations and some directions for further study.

First, and most importantly, congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs represent an increasingly significant foreign policy phenomenon across the entire Post-World War II period. While entrepreneurs can be found in each party, entrepreneurship is more common from members of the majority party in Congress, particularly when the majority party is the president’s opposition. While entrepreneurship is more common in the Senate, inter-chamber differences have dramatically narrowed in the Post-Cold War period. Contrary to expectations, military-security issues, not economic-developmental ones, motivate entrepreneurs most.

Our data and analysis suggest that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs are motivated by policy disagreement. A careful reading of the historical record reveals that they begin to initiate their own foreign policy agendas when the administration will not act on the issues that concern them.
or when, in their view, the administration’s policy on an issue needs to be rejected and replaced. While many observers have noted such behavior in Congress following the Vietnam War, not as many recognize it in the Post-Cold War era. Yet, these findings show that there are more congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs per year in the Post-Cold War period than in the Cold War Dissensus period, and it is particularly a function of opposition party membership. Given the continuing absence of a foreign policy consensus, the increasingly diffuse security risks of a multi-polar world, and the increasingly obvious linkages of an interdependent world economy, it seems hardly surprising that members of Congress find policy incentives to try to chart their own course in foreign policy in the 1990s. This trend can be expected to continue into the early twenty-first century.

Increasing partisanship reinforces this rise in foreign policy entrepreneurship in Congress. As noted previously, multiple studies have shown that foreign policy is becoming an increasingly partisan activity in Washington. As one recent study of Congress concluded, “congressional-executive relations have been marked by greater discord since the Cold War’s end, thus undermining bipartisanship in the conduct of American foreign policy” (Wittkopf and McCormick 1998, 450). This study confirms that pattern as it relates to congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs. Rising consistently through each time period, by the post-Cold War era almost three-fourths of all entrepreneurship comes from members of the opposition party, with the vast majority of that occurring when the opposition party is also in the majority. Clearly, partisanship reinforces policy disagreement between the branches, and this trend is growing.

The implications of this study reflect the obvious importance of divided government. Less than half of the instances of entrepreneurship came from opposition party members during the Cold War Consensus period, but then only four of the ten years in that sub-sample—1954, 1958, 1959, and 1960—featured opposition party control of one of the congressional chambers. Divided government was found in 80 percent of both the Cold War Dissensus sub-sample—1970, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987—and in four of the five years in the Post-Cold War sub-sample, 1992, 1996, 1997, and 1999. As long as divided government remains a prevalent feature of American government, foreign policy entrepreneurship in Congress seems likely to remain a prevalent factor in foreign policy making.

With respect to entrepreneurial behavior, the data in this study indicate increasing and more varied efforts across a range of foreign policy issues. More specifically though, the data indicate that at the heart of congressional
foreign policy entrepreneurship is a focus on direct-legislative action in the form of issue-specific legislation, appropriations, and other such activity. Congressional activism may well encompass a wider range of activity as suggested by Burgin (1997), Carter (1998), Lindsay (1993), and Scott (1997), but entrepreneurs generally seek to enact their preferences through the more direct route. Additionally, while congressional foreign policy activism is probably becoming more widely dispersed as members from more and more committees and subcommittees and the rank and file address foreign policy issues, entrepreneurs seem to have gravitated over time to the traditional foreign policy committees (Lindsay 1994b; McCormick 1993; Ripley and Lindsay 1993; Sinclair 1993). This is consistent with the interest in and commitment to foreign policy these entrepreneurs exhibit and the opportunities for sustained attention membership in such committees offers. The apparently anomalous result also distinguishes between general foreign policy activism, which as Hersman (2000) notes is increasingly liable to come from anywhere, and congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship, which is increasing liable to come from the foreign policy committees. The importance of these committees is also seen in the steady rise of activities falling into the indirect legislative avenue. These committees are the ones most likely to deal with non-binding resolutions, confirmations of appointments, and procedural legislation, and they are typically the “home court” for the activities denoted by the “new institutionalism” concept (Lindsay 1994a). This result is all the more interesting because the literature concludes that these committees, especially foreign relations, have lost influence to others. It appears those conclusions should be reconsidered.

In short, congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship is an under-examined but very real fact of life in the nation’s capital. With so many members of Congress acting on their own foreign policy agendas, it is little wonder that most participants and political observers see Congress as increasingly active and assertive in its foreign policy-making roles. Given the lack of consensus over foreign policy as we enter the twenty-first century, opportunities for policy disagreement and thus more congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship can generally be expected to abound.

Several directions for future research flow from this initial attempt to get an overview of congressional entrepreneurship. At least three areas seem most significant. First, while the choice of data source provided a valuable and efficient opportunity to build a foundation of information on the nature of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs at the outset of this project, it is limited in important ways. Most critically, it appears that the
Congressional Quarterly Almanacs do not heavily report some of the more indirect or non-legislative entrepreneurial activities that we know occur. Examples include writing op-ed pieces for major newspapers or appearing on television or in other media outlets and also a thorough source of information on oversight activities, foreign contacts, and other similar activities. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches can be used to try to fill in such missing pieces to the fabric of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship. Second, the best way to understand how and why members of Congress engage in such entrepreneurship would require the building of quantitative data sets to be augmented with a comparative case study approach of specific entrepreneurs and their campaigns to shape policy. Indeed, such a multi-method approach comprises the next stage of this research project. Finally, the efforts of entrepreneurs need to be more clearly connected to their impact on policy, or what is actually done. Our analysis here focuses on their characteristics and their general behavior. Their effect on policy is the vital third facet of the congressional foreign policy entrepreneur puzzle. This will require a broader set of data, both qualitative and quantitative, and the careful use of case studies. In the end, however, because these individuals choose to take the lead, they must be accounted for.
Acknowledgement: We would like to thank those who commented on earlier versions of this research presented at several International Studies Association-Midwest Conferences. In addition to the anonymous reviewers of this article, special thanks go to Marijke Breuning, Mary Durfee, Ryan Hendrickson, Marie Henehan, Steve Hook, Carolyn James, Pat James, Loch Johnson, James McCormick, Peter Schraeder, and John Vasquez for their suggestions for the project; to C. James Della et and Carie A. Steele for their valuable research assistance; and to the Dirksen Congressional Center and the Research Services Council of the University of Nebraska at Kearney for their financial support.

Notes

1 In particular, see Table 2 in Carter (1986, 335).

2 The random sequence generator was found at http://www.random.org.

3 We both coded 1968 and 1972 as intercoder reliability test years, thereafter dividing the rest of the years between us.

4 Such incremental changes may represent instances of congressional assertiveness; however, such assertiveness is not the same as the concept of entrepreneurship that guides this study.

5 Cutting an aid figure to zero is not considered an incremental change here. We see deleting all aid to an intended recipient as a fundamental redefinition of a foreign policy issue, and thus an entrepreneurial act.

6 Direct Legislative avenues include issue-specific legislation, treaties, the war power, appropriation, and trade; Indirect Legislative avenues include resolutions, appointments, and procedural legislation; Direct Non-legislative avenues include informal advice/letters, consultations, oversight/hearings, and use of courts; and Indirect Non-legislative avenues include framing opinion and foreign contacts.

7 Intercoder reliability was measured with the widely-used Scott’s \( \phi \), which, as Holsti (1969, 140) shows, is computed thus:

\[
\phi = \frac{\% \text{ observed agreement} - \% \text{ expected agreement}}{1 - \% \text{ expected agreement}}
\]
Intercoder reliability needed to be determined for the identification of entrepreneurial cases from the year selected and for three key variables in each case: the issue category, the activity used, and the access point used. To be considered reliable, the value of Scott’s $\pi$ needed to be .70 or higher (McManus and Dorfman 2002). The initial test year we coded was 1968. The value for Scott’s $\pi$ for the identification of entrepreneurial cases was unacceptable, -.27. After conferring, we coded the cases from 1972. That produced a better but still unacceptable value, -.07. Following further consultation, our try for 1972 produced an acceptable value of Scott’s $\pi$, .77. From that point on, any time we had doubts about whether a case represented entrepreneurship, rather than just congressional assertiveness, we consulted each other to resolve the matter of case identification. Thus for the entire dataset, the value of .77 is a conservative one, as any ambiguities or questions were continually resolved between us. Intercoder reliability measures for the other variables clearly exceeded the .70 threshold for 1968. Those measures were .88 for the Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969) issue categorization; .91 for the activity employed; and 1.00 for the access point used.
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